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Die Aufhebung in George MacDonald
Bonnie Gaarden
This essay demonstrates the similarities between George MacDonald’s
portrayal of human spiritual development and Hegelian dialectic. Hegel
described human consciousness as evolving through a process he called
aufheben, which involves the transcendence of conflict. At each successive
stage of development, formerly conflicting elements are seen as necessary
parts of a larger whole. This model was extremely influential among Romantic
writers and became an important element in Jung’s psychology. We can clearly
see it at work in “Birth, Dreaming, and Death,” one of the brief narrative
sketches originally included in MacDonald’s Adela Cathecart.

I

n this essay I propose to demonstrate that George MacDonald, at
least sometimes, portrayed human spiritual development as occurring along
the lines of Hegelian dialectic. This similarity is unsurprising, since Hegel’s
philosophical system helped develop the ideas collectively called German
Romanticism, and MacDonald, as is widely known, was heavily influenced by
Romanticism, both German and English. Though I am aware of no evidence
that MacDonald read Hegel, he was intimately acquainted with the works of
Novalis, Hoffmann, Goethe, Blake, Wordsworth, and Coleridge, whose ideas
about human development closely resemble those of Hegel’s philosophical
school.1
Hegel adopted Aristotle’s definition of God (“the Absolute”) as
“Thought thinking itself,” and postulated that the Absolute was in the process
of “realizing itself in the evolution of human consciousness (Copleston
206-08). In his Phenomenology of Spirit, he traces this evolution through
a crude perception of self/object up through the highest state of “Absolute
Knowledge,” in which God, through humans, has a clear philosophical
knowledge of himself who is All. Human consciousness evolves from one
discernable stage to another, through a process Hegel calls aufheben, which
means to annul, preserve, and transcend. (Abrams 230). In this process, the
tensions or conflicts inherent in one stage of consciousness are seen, from the
perspective of a higher stage, as necessary parts of a larger whole. The earlier
stage is thus cancelled—one grows beyond it—but is retained as part of the
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larger view.
For example, in the famous Master/Slave dialectic, Hegel describes a
state of consciousness in which two self-conscious entities perceive one another.
Each needs the other’s recognition to support its own sense of independent
selfhood, so they engage in a struggle over “life,” each wishing to establish
itself as the independent [41] being through the subordination of the other. In
this life-or-death struggle, the one who risks death becomes the Master, while
the one who fears death becomes the Slave. The Slave works for the Master;
the Master consumes the work of the Slave, and the Master clearly seems the
superior consciousness (Phenomenology 111-16).
However, moving outside of the Master/Slave antithesis, one can
see that, while the Master is fixed in a repetitive and ultimately empty
cycle of desire and consumption, Slave-consciousness develops through its
traumatic brush with death, its relationship to its work, and its recognition of the
independent selfhood of the Master. From this perspective, Slave-consciousness
seems the superior (Phenomenology 111-19). And the Master/Slave opposition
itself is swallowed up (or resolved) in the emergence of Stoicism, a “higher”
level of consciousness which, “whether on the throne or in chains,” seeks
truth and self-affirmation, not in particularity and dominance, but in abstract
Thought (Phenomenology 121).
In Stoicism, the self withdraws from the variable world into the
serenity of its own thought, so the hierarchy of stable thought over changeable
circumstance is established. Stoicism easily passes into Skepticism, which
refuses to form conclusions about anything exterior and remains certain only
of itself. However, the Skeptical consciousness eventually realizes that, in
order to live and act in the world, it has in fact formed convictions about all
sorts of matters, and finds itself oscillating between serene detachment from
all belief and a confused whirl of inconsistent positions. Thus, the hierarchy
of “draught” over “world” breaks down. (Phenomenology 122-26). Upon this
realization, Skeptical consciousness becomes what Hegel calls Unhappy
Consciousness, which recapitulates the Master/Slave conflict but on the higher
level of interiority; the Master (Unchangeable) and Slave (Variable) perceived
as two parts of itself. At first Unhappy Consciousness identifies with the
Variable, reversing the Skeptical hierarchy (this is why it is unhappy) but
perceives the Unchangeable as its “true” essence (Phenomenology 126-27).
This true, unchangeable essence is regarded with longing and devotion and
might be projected as God (Phenomenology 127-30). Finally conceptualizing
its own variability and relative nullity as sin, the Unhappy Consciousness

surrenders itself to the offices of a priestly mediator and accepts forgiveness.
This establishes, at least “in principle,” the unity of the Variable self with
the Unchangeable (Phenomenology 135-38). Thus Consciousness enters
the still-higher dialectical stage Hegel calls Reason and achieves Idealism.
The movement from Unhappy Consciousness to Idealism recapitulates
the movement from the Master/Slave conflict into Stoicism, but, rather than
transcending conflict by withdrawing from the world, as did Stoicism, Idealism
sees both subjective and objective Reality as itself, and thus is able to affirm
and accept the world rather than negate it (Phenomenology 139-40).
The above summary traces some of the lower steps in Hegel’s model
of human spiritual development, but it is enough to demonstrate the pattern
involved. The dialectical process proceeds from consciousness of a duality

to conflict. Out of this [42] conflict comes a hierarchy; in which one element
is perceived to be dominant over the other. The hierarchy thus established,
however, will not stay put, for, when examined, its terms are seen to be
reversible, and the subjugated element becomes the superior. This prompts (or
is simply followed by) Die Aufhebung, the lifting of the whole struggle onto
another, “higher” or more abstract level. Here both states of consciousness
are seen to be necessary developmental “moments,” and lose their antagonistic
energy as the thrust of the dialectic—the developmental “action”— moves to
a higher plane.
A process remarkably like Die Aufhebung goes on continually
in many of MacDonald’s characters. His son, Greville, called it “ethical
Evolution” (217).
MacDonald was a Universalist; that is, he believed that all
people would ultimately be brought into union with God. He postulated the
existence of a divine nature, a “Christ-self,” (Diary 17) not merely (as his
native Calvinism would have it) in the elect, but in all people. He was also a
panentheist,2 seeing Nature as Divine self-revelation. Thus “[T]he same God
who is in us, [...] also is all about us [...] And the two are ever trying to meet in
us?” (qtd in Greville MacDonald 280). According to most Christian orthodoxies
of the period, one was either “saved” or “not saved”; “in grace” or “out of
grace.” MacDonald conceived of salvation, however, not as an absolute state,
but as a continuing transformation (spiritual evolution) undergone by all people,
lasting through and beyond earthly existence. To make this unfamiliar concept
clear to his readers he depicted hell as a sort of divine reform school. “Away
with him to the outer darkness,” MacDonald paraphrases Matthew 22.13
and 26.30. “Perhaps that will make him repent” (Sermons 65). He asserted

that God was obligated, not simply to defeat sin in Creation, but to destroy
it altogether (Sermons 514ff), and believed that one day even “Death and
Hell” would be purified in the “Consuming Fire” of the Divine Being, so that
God would indeed be “all in all” (Sermons 32). The logical outcome of this
position, expressed imaginatively in the conclusion of his final major fantasy, is
the ancient (but subsequently rare) opinion of Origen that even Satan will at last
be reconciled to God (Lilith 228).
There is much more to the Good News According to St. George, but
this is enough to establish some gross similarities between his “system”
and Hegel’s. Some Christian world-views, particularly those which, like
Calvinism, adhere to the doctrine of total depravity, are “Kantian” in seeing a
closed ceiling between the transcendent and the empirical, the realm, of Divine
knowledge and the realm of human consciousness. The transcendent gleams
uncannily through the cracks in this closed ceiling, and sometimes, via the
lightning rod of particular genius or sanctity, blasts into the empirical to make
a spectacular, thought isolated, display; but, generally speaking, there is not
only no getting there from here, there is no perceiving there from here. There is
no such thing as a “natural” knowledge of God.
This theory of total divorce between the Divine and human, the
transcendent and the empirical, horrified MacDonald, and he protested against it

strongly and explicitly [43] in his theological writing. The logical consequence
of such a divorce is, of course, that what is “good” in the transcendent realm
might be base or wicked by human, empirical standards. “Where would be the
good news” MacDonald inquires indignantly, “if John said, ‘God is light, but
you cannot see his light [...] you have no notion, what light is; [...] what God
calls light may be horrible darkness to you, for you are of another nature from
him!’” (Sermons 545).
Rejecting the unreachable Transcendent of Kant and Calvin,
MacDonald’s own model is Hegelian in that he sees the transcendent working
immanently and intimately in every cranny of the empirical world like yeast
in bread, gradually but inexorably raising all human consciousness toward
participation in the Absolute. MacDonald, like Hegel, insists that God is
knowable by human consciousness (Philosophy of History 25, 30-31) though
what MacDonald means by “knowing” has little to do with Hegel’s notion
of clear intellectual comprehension. For MacDonald, human “knowing” of
God is like the loving, intimate and individual intercourse between parent
and child. Fredrick Copleston characterizes Hegel’s description of “religious
consciousness” (several steps above Idealism) as perceiving “Nature as the

creation and self-manifestation of God, with whom it is united in the depth of
its being and through whom it is united with other selves.” (224). This is an
exact statement of MacDonald’s belief about the relationship of God, humanity
and Nature.3 However, students and interpreters of Hegel disagree over
whether Hegel saw God (the Absolute) as having a transcendent existence
separate from and independent of the empirical world (Copleston 210, 218)
as MacDonald most certainly did. And, while Hegel, in his portrait of the
Absolute realizing itself through human history, focuses on the “big picture”
of nations, peoples, and cultures, MacDonald is exclusively concerned with
the evolution of individual consciousness. Nonetheless, both MacDonald
and Hegel conceive of the transcendent and the empirical, not as separated,
but interpenetrating one another, and human consciousness, not as leaping
from one absolute state to another, but evolving through the experiencing
and overcoming of painful conflicts and oppositions which are progressively
subsumed into higher and more complete perceptions of reality.
In “Birth, Dreaming, and Death,” MacDonald explicitly delineates a
process of spiritual growth very like Hegel’s dialectic. While I would claim
that a Hegelian progress through increasingly higher states of consciousness
is typical of MacDonald’s characters, in this story there is little to distract from
it: as a narrative, the story is not much. Originally published as one of the
interpolated tales in Adela Cathcart, it is really a reflective meditation on the
meaning of human suffering.
In his writing, MacDonald regularly and resolutely confronts the
implications of the cosmic optimism he expressed bluntly in Phantastes:
“what we call evil, is the only and best shape, which, for the person and
his condition at the time, could be assumed by the best good” (324). The
dialectic that dominates much of his fiction is [44] that between the realm of
God’s eternity, in which all is One in God, and human temporal experience,
which contains both good and evil. The end of the dialectic is that evil will
be perceived to be a “developmental moment’’ in the evolution of the good;4
as Lady Julian says, “Sin is behovable, but all shall be well, and all shall be
well, and all manner of thing shall be well” (35, 103). For MacDonald, life
is a Purgatory readying God’s children for the bliss of Divine Union, and all
pain is potentially birth pain. This brief narrative clearly demonstrates that
MacDonald’s model of human spiritual development is extremely like Hegel’s.
“Birth, Dreaming and Death” portrays God as the ultimate
Schoolmaster, guiding a young couple toward the “Really Real.” The goal
of MacDonald’s spiritual evolution, dramatized in his fiction and fantasy, is

explicated in his sermon “The Child in the Midst” (Sermons 1-17). His central
text is Matthew 18.3 and its cognates: “Unless ye become as little children, ye
shall not enter the kingdom of heaven.” Here he asserts that, “God is childlike”
(18) and “Childhood belongs to the Divine nature” (19). The Childhood of
God, according to MacDonald, consists in the simplicity of his loving devotion:
“He has not two thoughts about us. With him all is simplicity of purpose and
meaning and effort and end—namely, that we should be as he is, think the same
thoughts, mean the same things, possess the same blessedness [...] he alone can
be perfectly, abandonedly, simple and devoted” (22,24). The blessedness of God,
to which he seeks to raise his children, is “that he wants nothing for himself,
but finds his blessedness in the outgoing of blessedness [...] He gives himself
to us—shall we not give ourselves to him? Shall we not give ourselves to each
other whom he loves?” (21). Thus, for MacDonald, growth in wisdom and
goodness is an ever-deeper participation in a Divine Childhood whose essence is
self-giving love.
The first three pages of the story elaborate the two opposing sets of
values available to the young couple who are its focus: the hierarchy of human
society, which puts a premium on achieving wealth and social status, and the
eternity of God, which puts a premium on each “man’s becoming that which
God meant him to be,” whether (figuratively speaking) God means him to be
a glow-worm or a star according to the “relative” values of the human social
economy. “God and man can meet,” MacDonald’s narrator asserts, only by
a person’s being true to God in his “own being” and realizing his divinelyappointed telios. Only thus can one rise above entanglement in the relative and
temporal and “behold and love and live the unchangeable, the essential, the
divine” (175).
As the story opens, the young couple have aleady begun to grasp
eternal, as opposed to temporal and relative, values. They are poor. The young
man’s former aspirations to the ministry were blocked by “either poverty or
[,..] theological difficulty” and he is now a village schoolmaster. The death of
his worldly ambition, the narrator asserts, was actually a positive good, because
an exchange of love and reverence with boys and girls (teaching) is far better
than “pour[ing] one’s words into the filter of religious suspicion” to be judged
by “ignorant party-spirit” (preaching). [45] He has married a “simple village
girl,” and he and his wife are windows into Divinity for one another. Through
him, she is able to see “the real forms of all things around,” and through her
he looks “into the great depths that could not be measured or represented,”
possessing “the eternal and the unchangeable” and finding “in her love the

verdict of God, that he was worth loving” (174). That their material poverty is
a spiritual asset is suggested by the description of the young man’s relation to his
scanty collection of books: “But his love for the souls of his individual books
was the stronger mat there was no possibility of its degenerating into avarice for
the bodies or outsides whose aggregate constitutes the piece of house-furniture
called a library” (173-74).
Initially we find earthly values dominating their thinking. The young
wife has just given birth to the couple’s first child. The husband, anxious about
his poverty and his wife’s “feeble health,” cannot help but see the new baby
as a liability (176). The wife is often troubled because she is simple and
uneducated and therefore, she fears, unworthy of her husband’s love (179). We
might characterize this stage as the consciousness of Lack.
But into this spiritual conflict, when temporal values have assumed
ascendancy, God shows them eternal truth in dreams that effect an inversion of
this perceptual hierarchy. The husband dreams that, out of a winter storm, a little
orphan child comes to his door. He takes the child in, bathes him, and even in
his economic difficulties “he felt that he could not part with [the child] again.”
The child then tells him “I am the child Jesus,” and “Any other child is like me”
(177). The wife dreams that she is a humble nosegay of wildflowers lying for
sale in a shop window along with much fancier bouquets, when her husband
enters the shop and selects her from among the others to take home. When
they wake from these dreams, their external situation remains unchanged,
but the wife now sees that, in the fatherly embrace of God, she has the worth
of a “beautiful singing angel” to her husband and child. To the husband, God’s
providence is now more real than his own poverty, and the child, instead of
being a liability, has become a supreme asset: he is now identified with the
child Jesus, and thus a divine incarnation. In receiving the baby, the couple
has received God. Thus the hierarchy of the first stage is inverted, and divine
“reality” takes dominance over material “appearance.” Consciousness of Lack
has been displaced by a consciousness of Wealth.
In this second-stage consciousness, the couple, who already “knew”
that God was their father, have been brought to a more powerful realization
of what it means to be God’s children. The husband goes joyfully to his
schoolhouse, knowing that “he was God’s child doing God’s work,” (178) while
the wife knows that God will “richly meet the fearing hope of thy child’s heart”
with a transforming love even more potent than her dream-husband’s (180). In
this perceptual inversion from Lack to Wealth, then, we might say that, from
seeing themselves as needy children, they have become conscious of themselves

as children provided for. [46]
However, as the narrator warns us, there are higher states than that of
childlike trust, and a harder “lesson” is coming from the Divine Schoolmaster:
the baby dies. This produces the second-stage conflict: the wife cannot relinquish
the child but keeps his body beside her in his cradle, and the grief-stricken
husband supposes that God is punishing him for his earlier doubt. But this
conflict is soon followed by Die Aufhebung, a movement to a higher plane of
consciousness. No longer are the couple to be simply children of God—that
is, appreciative recipients of his love and providence. Instead, they begin to
participate in the Divine Childhood, itself, and manifest the self-giving love
of a God who/finds his blessedness in the outgoing of blessedness” (Sermons
14).
Through the process of her grief, before the child is buried, the wife
resolves that, though deprived of motherhood, she will find her relief in being
more childlike (“more simple, and truthful, and joyful”) toward God, for “is
it not the same nature that makes the true mother and the true child? Is it not
the same thought blossoming upward and blossoming downward? So there is
God the Father and God the Son” (183). She will, she says, “go back” and be
God’s child “more than ever,” and the Child of God with whom she explicitly
identifies is God the Son: she will be like Jesus. MacDonald declares of God
that “The Fatherhood and the Sonship are one, save that the Fatherhood looks
down lovingly, and the Sonship looks up lovingly. Love is all” (Sermons 13).
The essence of Divinity is giving love, and as the wife identifies with Divinity,
she makes a gift of herself and her baby to God: “Thou wilt keep my little son
for me [...] Here I am, do with me what thou wilt.” The baby, she realizes,
is not less hers because God has taken him; he has only “gone home to be
nursed” for her (183-84).
The father, too, comes to realize that God “givest not, to take again”
(186). Upon hearing of the death of an old reprobate, he at first assumes that
the “soiled” old man and his own pure baby must have nothing in common,
and different eternal destinies (184). But when he hears of the old man’s
childlike request that his nurse give him a kiss before he dies, the father
thinks differently, imagining his baby interceding for the old man with a close
paraphrase of Jesus’ words on the cross: “Lord, forgive this old man, for he
knew not what he did” (186; Luke 23.34) And the father himself joins in this
intercession. He paraphrases St. Stephen’s prayer as he was martyred: “have
mercy upon the poor old man, and lay not his sins to his charge”(186; Acts
7.60).

As recorded in the book of Acts, the death of Stephen, the first
Christian martyr, closely parallels the death of Christ, making Stephen the
“type” of both Christ and all future Christian martyrs.5 The father, after his
perceptual inversion, knew that in receiving his new baby he received Christ
into his household and God into his heart. Now, however, like Stephen the
martyr, he himself incarnates the Divine Childhood in an outflow of Divine
love. As, with his baby (who has already been identified with the Christ-child),

he performs the compassionate office of God the Son, he too is like [47] Jesus.
He, like his wife, moves from receiving from God to giving himself and his
family to God: “take my child and his mother and me, and do what thou wilt
with us” (186). MacDonald says of Jesus: “giving himself with perfect will
to God [...] He therein creates in himself a new and higher life [...] his disciple
must live by the same absolute devotion of his will to the Father’s. Then is his
life one with the life of the Father” (Sermons 422-24). This movement from
receiving love to self-giving love is a critical step in MacDonald’s spiritual
evolution:
Better to sit at the water’s birth
Than a sea of waves to win;
To live in the love that floweth forth
Than the love that cometh in.
Be thy heart a well of love, my child,
Flowing and free and sure;
For a cistern of love, though undefiled,
Keeps not the spirit pure. (Phantastes 244-45)
In Hegelian dialectic, appearances succeed one another, each, in
turn, superseded in the progress toward Absolute Knowing (Phenomenology
95-98). A similar process occurs in this story, to the tide, “Dreaming” replaces
“Life” as the middle term between Birth and Death. This might imply that life
is dream, or that dream is life; I suspect that MacDonald meant both. For him,
like earlier Romantics, the imagination was the gateway to truth, and in his
fiction, dreams often convey God’s meaning, or the reality behind, a temporal
appearance. In “Birth, Dreaming and Death,” their dreams brought the parents
truths that were more real than the values and viewpoint of the material world.
MacDonald was fond of Novalis’ statement, “Our life is no dream, but it may,
and perhaps ought to, become one.” Late in his life he wrote that while earthly
existence is a “splendid thing,” “but for my hope in God, I should feel it but a
phantasmagoria” (Greville MacDonald 535).
For MacDonald, as for generations of Christian mystics, the Unseen is

realer than the Seen. This principle has an analogue in Hegel, who maintained
that the concrete and particular (the material) only gains its significance
through the general and abstract (the conceptual or spiritual) (Phenomenology
66-67). So the parents’ values are inverted when they accept their dreams
as the truth behind their waking perceptions of the material world, and they
aufgehoben from being children of Deity into Divine Children when they
suffer an apparent bereavement that actually eternalizes and generalizes their
gain: the particular, concrete child, seemingly lost, has actually “gone home” to
be “nursed” for them, and as they are able to perceive this, they are lifted into
the “outgoing” blessedness of the Divine Childhood. The “loss” in one stage
has left them, in the next, more able to give.
I have traced the “ethical evolution” of the characters in this story
because MacDonald spells it out so explicitly that its Helgelian character is
easy to see. But the process of a perceptual inversion, followed by a difficult
renunciation that lifts [48] (aufheben) a character to a higher spiritual
plane, is a frequent pattern in MacDonald’s fantasy and fiction. The overall
similarities between MacDonald’s thought and that of Hegel are, generally
speaking, those they share with other Romantics: the Pauline notion that
the universal telios is that “God will be all in all”; that the end of the human
journey is to arrive where we started, back home in God, but that the final
unity is superior to the first in that it retains the individuality developed in the
process; that me developmental road is a process of progressively overcoming
painful contradictions and contraries that recapitulate the sufferings of
Christ (Abrams 255). Their differences are, it would seem, the differences
between panentheism and pantheism. Though MacDonald’s descriptions of the
ultimate unity between God and humanity can sound amazingly like Hegel’s,
MacDonald did not conceive of God as the “World-Spirit,” or simply the
Totality of what exists. He speaks of people as from God, of God, living and
moving and having their being in God, but not of humanity being God. For
Hegel, the “religious consciousness,” though true, is only “picture-thinking’’
(Phenomenology 463). In. the stage of Absolute Knowledge, humanity is “at
home with itself in its Otherness,”(Abrams 230) and recognizes the drama of
creation, incarnation, redemption, resurrection, and ascension an externalization
of an internal process (Phenomenology 485). Although different interpretations
exist, the preponderance of scholarly opinion seems to be that Hegel saw
God and the World as the same entity regarded in different perspectives
(Coppleston 237, 292-94). MacDonald, like all Christian mystics, would affirm
that the Divine drama mirrors human spiritual growth, and that knowing the

Divine drama as taking place inside oneself is a “higher” spiritual state than
merely perceiving it as having happened outside, in the past, in the remote
historical Christ. But he would not, I think, characterize the historical Divine
drama as “picture-thinking.’’ His model of Divine-human unity is not Cosmic
Consciousness in which the individual identifies with the Universe, but the
Divine Father with all his children gathered around his hearth-fire. His model
of unity-in-diversity is not the two-sided coin, but—as in “Birth, Dreaming
and Death”—the family.
Look again at MacDonald’s story. Christ (the baby), comes to the
family of humanity to show it that it is God’s beloved child. Then, as in John’s
gospel, Christ (the baby) leaves, so that the Paraclete—the indwelling Holy
Spirit, replicating in the human heart the outgoing love of God—may come.
Hegel applies the same figure to the disappearance of the picture-Christ to give
place: to humanity’s Absolute Knowledge of itself as God (Phenomenology
475).
So, though their concept of the “Really Real” differs, both men see the
Biblical story as recapitulated in human experience, as human consciousness
progresses dialectically from the temporal experience of division and suffering
to eternal unity and joy. [49]
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Notes
1. In his classic work on Romantic thought, Natural Supernaturalism, M. H. Abrams traces
the common pattern of human development perceived by philosophers such as Fichte,
Shelling, and Hegel and the German and English imaginative writers who have come to be
called “Romantics.”
2. Wordsworth’s position MacDonald called “Christian Pantheism.” He believed that, while
Nature is God’s self-revelation, God is also transcendent and exists outside of nature and the
material world, (panentheism). See the discussion in “Wordsworth’s Poetry” in A Dish of
Orts.
3. See MacDonald’s vision of the human telios as he describes it at the end of Lilith: “Now,
the soul of everything I met came out to greet me and make friends with me, telling me we
came from the same, and meant the same. I was going to him, they said, with whom they
always were, and whom they always meant” (257).
4. Hegel says that evil—which is “self-centered being-for-self—and good—which is
“simple and without a self”—are both “suspended moments” in the development of human
consciousness, and, because God is All, they are therefore “suspended moments” in God as
well. However, the other Hegelian antitheses, their opposition will be transcended when
they are perceived as “a spiritual unity, or the unity in which the differences are present only
as moments or only as suspended” (Phenomenology 472-73).
5. In Luke/Acts, both Stephen and Jesus work miracles and signs among the people, defeat
their more traditional opponents in religious arguments, are brought to trial before the
Sanhedrin and convicted on the evidence of false witnesses, and are executed forgiving their
murderers. [50]

